Law and History by Friedrich, C. J.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 14 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - October 1961 Article 1 
10-1961 
Law and History 
C. J. Friedrich 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. J. Friedrich, Law and History, 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 1027 (1961) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol14/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 14 OCTOBER, 1961 NUMBER 4
LAW AND HISTORY
C. J. FRIEDRICH*
Law is frozen history. In an elementary sense, everything we
study when we study law is the report of an event in history, and
all history consists of such records or reports. It therefore cannot
be my task to develop a sermon on the importance of historical
records for the understanding of the law; the tie is too intimate and
too obvious to need laboring.
"The work of Professor Maine on 'Ancient Law,'" wrote Professor
T. W. Dwight in his Introduction to that book in the sixties of the
last century, "is almost the only one in the English language in which
general jurisprudence is regarded from the historical point of view."'
This is an astonishing statement, considering the strikingly historical
pattern of the common law. It is possibly correct, if taken very
precisely. But was not the work of Blackstone or the work of Coke
general jurisprudence from the historical point of view? Was it not
their preoccupation with history, with the past, which aroused Jeremy
Bentham against the jurisprudence of Blackstone and his predecessors?
Law cannot of course be identified with "general jurisprudence" in
any case; but leaving that issue aside, English and American law
appear in fact to be "frozen history"; the institutions by which they
are constituted are the outgrowth of that process which in Burke's
memorable phrase links the dead of the past with the generations
yet unborn.
But what of history? Is history conceivable without law? Certainly
not the history of our western world, though there are civilizations,
such as the Chinese during most of its existence, which have not
placed law into such a central position. It is patent that neither
medieval nor modern history can be written or understood without
careful attention to legal institutions. From feudalism to capitalism,
from Magna Carta to the constitutions of contemporary Europe, the
historian encounters law at every turn as a decisive factor.
It would seem, then, that any re-consideration of "law and history"
* Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard University.
1. Dwight, Introduction to MAwE, ANCIENT LAW at ix (3d Am. ed. 1864).
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is apt to be a string of common-places or the beating of a dead horse.
Names such as Maine and Savigny, Maitland and Gierke, McIlwain
and Olivier-Martin-not to mention Holmes as the last in a succession
of historically minded judges-clearly seem to settle the question of
history's importance for law; it would not be difficult to match them
with others signalizing the importance of law for history.
Such encounter between history and law is especially frequent in
the history of political thought. One has only to open one of the
books on the subject in order to discover that such a history is at
least half a history of jurisprudence. From the Sophists and Plato
to Hegel and Marx, the philosophy of law in historical perspective is
inseparably intertwined with the history of political ideas. "The
prevalent moral and political theories" were fully recognized by Oliver
Wendell Holmes to be the key to the understanding of the law. It
is equally true that the living law is one of the focal points of all
political theory; in it is crystallized what men in their time consider
just, and there can be no understanding of the political order without
a grasp of the common coin of such values, interests and beliefs as the
idea of justice embodies at various stages of historical development.
Political thought and legal thought are two sides of the same com-
mon coin.
The history of political thought and theory is itself not free from
formidable difficulties, however. Unless we are to assume that words
mean the same at all times or at least over long periods, virtually
all the positions which it deals with are highly controversial. Plato
and Aristotle, Cicero and St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant-
each and all have been the subject of extended learned controversy
over what they really said. It may be true, and probably is, that "to
know someone else's activity of thinking is possible only on the
assumption that this same activity can be re-enacted in one's own
mind."2 But it cannot be "proven" that this condition can be fulfilled,
that such re-enactment is possible. Similarly, it may well be that the
task of "discovering 'what Plato thought' without inquiring 'whether
it is true"' is "self-contradictory,"3 but it is equally likely that the
question whether what Plato thought be true is meaningless, unless
we first know what it was that he thought. This implies that "an act
of thought, in addition to actually happening, is capable of sustaining
itself and being revived and repeated without loss of its identity.' 4
2. CoLLmGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY pt. V, ff 4 (1946). I do not share
Collingwood's "idealist" premises, but I do find many of his formulations on
history good. Cf. SWABEY, THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY (1954) for a sounder
position.
3. COLUNGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 300.
4. Ibid.
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Such an implication is surely a self-evident proposition. If every
thought, like all other acts, happens in context, is "an organic part
of the thinker's life," then as the context changes the thought will
necessarily also change. If then there is to be any continuity of
thought it must be possible to relate degree of stability in context to
degree of self-identity in thought. Hence the more abstract the
thought, in the sense of being abstracted from specific detail in the
context within and to which it applies, the more stable it presumably
will be.5 Here is the key dilemma of all historical effort at dealing
with products of the mind which constitute creative responses to
concrete problematic situations. Legal history shares it, as does
political theory. By referring one to the other, we are possibly in-
viting the blind to lead the blind. Neither a reference to the pre-
supposed identity of experience, nor to the constancy in the
environment so experienced resolves it.
In our age of doubt and scepticism, the problem cannot be so
easily disposed of. "The life of the law" may not be "logic, but ex-
perience," as Holmes is ever again quoted as saying (though this view
has a hoary ancestry). The wonderful passage which follows that
famous generalization provides in a sense the theme for any discussion
of law and history which is undertaken in light of the common law.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends
to become.6
The experience, then, is historical experience. This means that with-
out history there cannot be, there would not be any law or juris-
prudence. History is here simply conceived as the record of human
experience. Yet, both "What is law?" and "What is history?" are
questions which have not ceased to trouble the reflective student of
both fields. It is not my intention to enter upon the task of seeking
definitive answers to either of these never-ending queriesi though I
5. Collingwood observes in this connection that "the mere fact that someone
has expressed his thoughts in writing, and that we possess his works, does
not enable us to understand his thoughts. In order that we may do so, we
must come to the reading of them prepared with an experience sufficiently
like his own to make those thoughts organic to it." Is it really probable that
any man today will be able to share the experience of a fifth century
Athenian sufficiently to think Plato's thoughts on politics? I should say that,
at best, only the most general features of such thought may be comprehended.
6. HoLmES, TnE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
19611 1029
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
will deal with both again later; rather, I intend to point out that
neither question can be answered except within the context of a
philosophical appraisal of law or history. And that means inexcapably
that he who would discourse upon "law and history" would have to
state first of all the philosophical context within which he is prepared
to discuss either "in general." Such an undertaking might be of
some interest, especially if the philosophy were novel. For if we
stayed with established philosophical positions, such as those of Hegel
or Dewey or Jaspers, all we would need to do would be to report
what these eminent thinkers have had to say about our two fields
and to match their positions as best we may. Thus Hegel concludes
his remarkable but much misunderstood and misquoted Philosophy
of Right and Law with a brief summary of his philosophy of history.
This summary states with admirable succinctness his view of their
relationship: law is the embodiment of the ethical idea emanating
from the state; as such it is embedded in history which consists in
the unfolding of the world spirit's idea of freedom by way of the
states which progressively realize it.7 And if it were objected that
such a view is hardly relevant today, we might reply that its Marxian
variant in Diamat is still very much with us and indeed perhaps our
major plague. But I am not a Hegelian and hence am merely giving
his notions as an illustration of a thinker who clearly and explicitly
argued the philosophical relation of law and history in his terms.8
The philosophy of history has moved a long way from Hegel. But
it is very much alive. In our day, the sceptical view of Becker for
whom every man was his own historian, the biological view of
Spengler for whom history was embodied in cultural or civilizational
wholes each of which was a law unto itself, its variant in Toynbee
who believes in an ascent 9-these and many lesser (though not less
interesting) conceptions testify to the fascination which a view of
the whole of man's existence on this globe exerts at present. Indeed,
the extension of this view beyond the confines of written records to
7. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT) §§ 341-60 (Hoffmeister ed. 1955). This most recent critical edition
omits the additions (Zusaetze) which Hegel's editors had inserted on the
basis of lecture notes, as well as the subtitle NATURREcHT UND STAATSWIS-
SENSCHAFT (NATURAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN OUTLINE). The latter
omission is regrettable, since the subtitle better describes the content of the
book.
8. For a brief sketch of Hegel's philosophy of law see my THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ch. XV (1958). See the more detailed
discussion in CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL ch. XIV (1949).
9. SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (1926); TOYNBEE, A STUDY or HISTORY
(1934-54). Among the many critical evaluations I especially found myself in
accord with HUGHES, OSWALD SPENGLER-A CRITICAL ESTIMATE (1952), and
with GEYL, DEBATES WITH HISTORIANS ch. VIII (1955) ("Toynbee the
Prophet").
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prehistory and the "endless journey"'10 which precedes it has added
both poignancy and a certain weariness to the task, as ever more
"cultures" have knocked at the gate to be admitted to "history" as
well as to the United Nations. All such endeavors are somehow
bound up with the convictions that history is something more than
"making sense out of nonsense."1 1 To the unsophisticated, history
is "of course" that which happened, the concrete actions and events
in all their specificity and effervescence. Indeed, many historians
continue their arduous labors with something of this sort in mind.
They are "looking" for history as it really happened---"wie es
wirklich gewesen." This memorable and simple phrase belongs of
course to the great Ranke, himself a striking illustration of how far
the great historian's achievement is from merely recounting how it
really happened.12 But the perplexing paradox of all historical work
is that what actually happened can never be recaptured, although
historical research would lose its point without a belief that more of
it can be recaptured than is presently known. It is certainly true
that each generation re-writes history in terms of its own values,
interests and beliefs, up to a point at least; it is also certainly true
that discoveries of new material may from time to time alter im-
portant images of past events and personalities. But the quest is never
complete, except in regard to such elementary data as the names and
dates of particular tidbits. The happenings of history as contrasted
with the reports about these happenings, the Geschehen in contrast
to the Geschichte,13 are devoured by time as soon as they happen. As
we go through our days, they vanish into oblivion.
If, then, all history is a gloss upon the happenings, in the form of
reports and interpretations of reports-such interpretations relating
them to other reports and to thoughts upon them-the intellectual
standing of such a gloss becomes a problem. And here the real issue
of the relation of law to history is joined. As I see it, the reports of
10. EISELY, THE IMMENSE JOURNEY (1946). Cf. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, THE
PHENOMENON OF MAN (1959); CLARK, THE ANTECEDENTS OF MAN (1959).
11. LESSING, GEscHxcHTE ALS SINNGEBUNG DES SINNLOSEN (1915); BECKER,
EVERY MAN HIs OWN HIsTORIAN (1935) (contains the essay by that name).
For contrast, see NEBUHR, FAnH AND HISTORY (1949).
12. See WAGNER, GEscHicHTswissENscHAFT ch. II (1951), which gives many
pertinent citations. The entire work is a most useful compendium of the
"theories" of history from the beginning to Max Weber; it is, of course, written
from the German perspective. The implicit idealism of Ranke which con-
tradicts his oft- and above-quoted saying can be seen in such statements as
"Alles Leben traegt sein Ideal in sich: der innerste Treb des geistigen Lebens
ist die Bewegung nach der Idee, nach einer groesseren Vortrefflichkeit ....
Id. at 194.
13. The nicety of this contrast is not quite caught by the English words
"happenings" and "history"; "Geschehen" carries the connotation of "by-
gones"-what has happened and is now accomplished fact. "Occurrences"
suffers from the same defect.
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cases which occurred and are made part of the body of the law are
related to other such reports in terms of the particular legal concept
or rule which they demonstrate as an occurrence in time. Anyone
opening a case book in any of the fields of law can see this clearly
enough. And a good case book of the older type sought to illuminate
the evolution of a concept and the rules it gave rise to by a succession
of such cases. Well-known case books, such as Bigelow's or Wigmore's
on torts, or Williston's on contracts, are essentially histories of the
particular legal institution with which they deal. Open any of them
and an instance of the proposition just stated suggest itself. Thus in
Scott and Simpson's Judicial Remedies14 the first case is Slade's.15 It
is a case from the Court of Queen's Bench, and the report begins as
follows:
Be it remembered that heretofore, that is to say, in the term of St.
Michael last past, before the lady the Queen at Westminster, came John
Slade, by Nich. Weare his attorney, and brought here into the Court of
the said lady the Queen, then there, his certain bill against Humphrey
Morley, in custody of the Marshal, etc. of a plea of trespass upon the
case ....
It then proceeds to tell how Morley defrauded John Slade by not
paying him for some wheat that he had harvested and promised to
pay for, the wheat growing on land which belonged to John Slade.
But what matters to the writers of this text is the form of pleadings
in appellate review in an instance of actions at law. Alongside is
placed a case from the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.16
The vast differences between the England of Queen Elizabeth I and
twentieth century America are of no significance to the point at issue
which is stated by the text writers as follows: "After final judgment
is rendered, the losing party can ordinarily carry the case to a higher
court."17 This statement presents a general principle of the law, deeply
involved in the tradition of the "rule of law," a concept which has
characterized adjudication over the centuries which have elapsed
between the reign of Elizabeth and our time. The stress is on what
is and has remained the same rather than on what has changed and
evolved. The view is dogmatic rather than historical.
This instance illustrates, as would thousands of others, that the
14. ScoTT & SimpsoN, CASES ON JuDIcAtL REMEDIEs 23 (1938).
15. 4 Co. Rep. 91a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602).
16. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
17. Interesting further points could be made regarding the fact that a
"record" of a particular kind, defined at law, goes to the appeals court,
embodying a "report" of what happened which excludes many events. In
the days of Queen Elizabeth the record usually contained only the pleadings,
the verdict and the judgment; nowadays it also contains some of the proceed-
ings at the trial.
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jurist is not concerned with the same dimension of interpretation as
is the historian. For to the historian, the key question about the
case would be: What does it tell us about the time of Queen Eliza-
beth? Is there anything here which sheds new light on Elizabeth, or
on the economic or social relations or any other of a number of pos-
sible individual historical features including the law, of her time.
And since the case as reported does not seem to do anything of the
sort, it might well be considered irrelevant and trifling to the his-
torian of Queen Elizabeth I's reign. Needless to say, the books on
her reign, and on the economic and social history of her reign do
not make mention of this case. Nor do the legal histories, in fact. If
we look up some of the leading texts on English legal history, such
as Holdsworth or Pound, we do not find this case; 18 instead we find
the rise of the Court of Chancery, from which this case is not taken,
to be the key feature of the history of English law in this period.
By the way, the rise of this court and of its equity jurisdiction has
been described by a great legal historian as "an exceedingly curious
episode." He added that "the whole nation seems to enter into one
large conspiracy to evade its own laws, to evade laws which it has
not the courage to reform."' 9 The rise of this equity jurisdiction, in
modification of the common law, was a matter of "stumbling into a
scheme for the reconciliation of permanence with progress." Such
a statement suggests that there is no effort made here to relate a
decisive development in the history of the law of England with any
of the other changing elements in the pattern of English life and
politics. I am not going to indicate here what might be some of the
correlations that suggest themselves, but will merely remark that a
deeper probing of the historical setting might well reveal connections
which a strictly doctrinal approach tends to overlook.
But I wish to go a step further now and to advance the argument
that the specific task of the student of law, of the jurist, is antithetical
to that of the historian. By the very nature of his enterprise he is
drawn into an a-historical position.
In a challenging inaugural lecture, Frederic W. Maitland in 1888
discussed the question: why the history of English law is not written.
20
He asserted at the outset that "English legal memory" went back to
the year 1189 and no further, indeed to Sept. 3, 1189.
Glanvill had just finished the first text-book that would become a
permanent classic for English lawyers; some clerk was just going to
write the earliest plea-roll that would come to our hands; in a superb
18. The case is actually cited by Holdsworth several times, but in connec-
tion with another matter.
19. MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HIsroRa 123 (1915).
20. 1 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 480-97 (Fisher ed. 1911).
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series of such rolls law was beginning to have a continuous written
memory, a memory that we can still take in our hands and handle.21
Soon these records were to swell to a mighty chorus and "the prac-
tical limit set to our knowledge is not set by any lack of evidence,
it is the limit of our leisure, our strength, our studiousness, our
curiosity."22 It was obvious to Maitland that no one man could
possibly hope to read the records even of one such reign as that of
Edward I; how could the history of English law ever be written.
"Seven hundred years of judicial records, six hundred years of law
reports; think how long a time seven centuries would be in the history
of Roman Law."23 Centralization and the good fortune of England's
insular position gave her "a series of records which for continuity,
catholicity, minute detail and authoritative value has.., no equal, no
rival, in the world."24 But it is the very fullness of this record which
has been a major obstacle to legal history. Yet there are others, the
most important being the isolation of English law and the conceit
common to the guild that English law is something unique. "History,"
Maitland observed, "involves comparison and the English lawyer
who knew nothing and cared nothing for any system but his own
hardly came in sight of legal history."25 And again: "[A]n isolated
system cannot explain itself, still less explain its history."26 Black-
stone could write his remarkable volumes because he had an image of
the feudal system, full of holes, in our modern perspective, but still
an image that enabled him "to paint his great picture . . . the first
picture ever painted"2 7 of the history of English land law. So much
for Maitland. There can be little doubt that the pursuit of legal
history on the Continent was greatly stimulated by the confrontation
of the local with the Roman law. The conflict between the two had
profound political importance in the bargain; while the Roman
law served ecclesiastical authorities at first, the "discovery" of its
"true meaning" was a powerful weapon in the hands of the partisans
of emperor and king. And eventually both were buried by the ivory
tower learning of the great humanist jurists who insisted upon the
historical record, Cujas, Doneau and the rest. The work of these
remarkable scholars serves at the same time to bring to light another
aspect of the conflict between law and history, namely that historical
learning can kill the value of the legal doctrine, because it removes
21. Id. at 481.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. at 482.
25. Id. at 488.
26. Id. at 489.
27. Ibid.
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it from its contemporary application back to its original setting and
thereby deprives it of authority and validity. The Roman law, which "-
had been a live source of legal thought in the hands of the great
glossators and post-glossators who used it for solving the problems of
their changing society, was in danger of becoming dead and lifeless
once the humanists had fully established its meaning in terms of a
society long gone, the pagan world of ancient Rome.2 However, the
much argued "reception" of the Roman law into the German law
in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, though much
lamented by the Romantics and "Germanists" such as Eichhorn
and Gierke, gave it a new lease on life; it also continued in consider-
able vigor in the South of France until the great codification (see
below). This can be vividly seen in Savigny's famous study on
possession which makes a startling companion to Holmes' chapter in
his Common Law. After reviewing the positions of Hegel and Kant
which he thinks are related to the positions of the Roman law, Holmes
remarks that Savigny did not follow them and quotes him as think-
ing that "every act of violence is unlawful" and considering "pro-
tection of possession a branch of protection to the person. '2 9 He puts
the matter as if this were a similarly philosophical opinion of
Savigny's. But a reading of the adduced paragraph six shows that
Savigny was arguing from the Roman law itself, was therefore
insisting that the right of possession was part of the law of obligations
rather than of the law of "things" (Sachenrecht). He sees the reason
in the historical fact that the Romans classified according to the
procedural considerations, exploring the distinction between jus in
rem and jus ad rem. He noted that possessio had always been a thorn
in the side of systematic jurists. All attempts to interpret possession
not as a distinct right, but as "provisional ownership" are in error,
Savigny thinks; he adduces for authority a general principle of the
Roman code: "nihil commune habet proprietas cum possessione."
Having thus pointed out the basic historical position, Savigny proceeds
to explore the linguistic usage of the Roman jurists to fortify his
position, distinguishing between possessio civilis and possessio nat-
urais.30 But I have already lingered too long over this fascinating
issue. Suffice it to add that Savigny was well aware of the fact that
the pristine Roman notions had undergone a basic development in the
course of history. The modifications which occurred are clearly seen
as the result of historical forces.
28. GILMORE, ARGUMENT FROM ROMAN LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 1200-1600
(1941).
29. Holmes, op. cit. supra note 6, at 207.
30. SAVIGNY, DAs RECHT DES BEsiTz s (1st ed. 1803). The paragraphs relevant
here and referred to by Holmes are 6 & 7. To these should be added para-
graph 48 where the concept is discussed.
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By the constitution of the Christian Church and of the European states
rights have been created and have been linked to the possession and
usufruct of the soil which the Romans partly did not know, and partly
were far from recognizing as rights belonging to an individual. Thus
the exercise of episcopal power depends upon the possession (Besitz)
of the church and its possessions .... 31
But a close examination leads Savigny to the conclusion that the
notion of possession in Roman law has "not been changed, but has
been very consistently developed." Roman law, then, can be seen
here as alive and still providing answers to concrete problems of the
"living law," albeit at times rather formal ones. Holmes, in com-
menting upon Savigny's historically argued position (in terms of
authority and precedent), allows himself to be too much influenced
by the philosophical generalizations of Kant and his followers. It
was not these generalizations but the dead hand of the past that
persuaded Savigny to take the position which Holmes criticizes in
terms of the common law's view of possession. But I am not sure
that he states Savigny's position correctly. I do not read him the way
Holmes does; 32 it is clear in any case that he does not enter upon the
historical argument, but treats the discussion dogmatically.
SMaitland was fully aware of this conflict, but when considering the
history of English law, he put it down as hindering the writing of
English legal history, because of the dogmatic preoccupation of the
English lawyer. English lawyers were dealing with medieval law
materials as lawyers, not as historians. "What is really required
of the practising lawyer is not, save in the rarest cases, a knowledge
of medieval law as it was in the middle ages, but rather a knowledge
of medieval law as interpreted by modern courts to suit modern
facts."33 Thus a case is the more valuable, the more recent it is;
"what the lawyer wants is authority and the newer the better; what
the historian wants is evidence and the older the better."3 4 This point
is of crucial importance for the right perspective on our problem.
For the lawyer, Coke is better authority than Bracton, but for the
historian seeking to interpret the law in the reign of Henry III
"Bracton's lightest word is infinitely more valuable than all the tomes
of Coke,"3 5 not to mention more recent commentary. There is a basic
conflict here which bedevils the task of legal history. We cannot say
31. Id. at 481.
32. HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 6, at 236. I find nothing in Savigny's care-
ful historical analysis to support the sentence that Savigny "thinks that there
must be always the same animus as at the moment of acquisition, and a
constant power to reproduce at will the original physical relations to the
object." See also Id. at 238.
33. 1 A TLAND, op. cit. supra note 19, at 490.
34. Id. at 491.
35. Ibid.
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that Maitland has fully escaped it. For he proceeds to expound the
notion that "any one who aspires to study legal history should begin
by studying modern law. '36 Is it not like saying that anyone aspiring
to study the history of philosophy or of art had better first study the
contemporary practice of these subjects? No one will deny that such
knowledge might be helpful, but is it essential? What then of the
study of legal history where it extends to systems of law which no
longer are alive? Can they not be studied at all? Indeed, such prac-
tical contemporary knowledge might be harmful, if not very carefully
controlled, because it might cause the kind of "anachronism" which
is so typically a-historical in the work of, say, Sir Edward Coke. He
knew the words and what use they could be made of in seventeenth
century England; he often did not know the meaning these words
possessed at the time they were uttered. A medieval historian, fully
alert to the conditions of the particular period and region in which
he had become an expert, would presumably be able to interpret
more adequately the tenor of the phrases of the period. For law
is not something separate and apart throughout the ages. It is part
and parcel of the culture which it helps to organize and to define.
Thus legal history is seen as part of cultural history. Yet the term
law does not even turn up in the index to Toynbee's magistral tomes
-a scandal of sorts, if one remembers that Toynbee is an Englishman.
How can culture, or at least Western culture, be imagined without
laws? All of man's everyday activities, his government and his econo-
my are regularized and given form by law. In innumerable ways the
history of certain cultures, and more especially Greco-Roman and
Western culture, is the history of the laws governing the communities
which compose it. We need not go as far as Sir Henry Maine, who in
one extraordinary passage attributed the difference between Roman
(Western?) and Indian civilization to the fact that the Romans had
their Twelve Tables. These he saw as "merely an enunciation in
words of the existing customs of the Roman people. '37 But he also
saw a law that "usage which is reasonable generates usage which is
unreasonable."38 Stressing the common Indogermanic ancestry, which
the ethnology of his time thought it could show, and acknowledging
a "substratum of forethought and sound judgment"3 9 in the Hindoo
jurisprudence, he yet imagined that the lack of an early code had
thwarted the development of Hindoo society; their law had been
drawn up "after the mischief had been done. '40 The civilization of
36. Id. at 494.
37. MAI , op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
38. Id. at 18.




these unfortunate Hindoos he saw as "feeble and perverted," while
the Romans "with their code ... were exempt from ... so unhappy
a destiny."41 The foolishness of these comments, in our perspective
of comparative cultural history, ought not to be allowed to hide the
greater truth dimly perceived by the great Henry Maine, namely
that a culture may be shaped, and often has been shaped, by its law.
There is an extraordinary passage in a later chapter (IV) of his
work which I now wish to quote in extenso, because it pushes this
issue further in a direction which seems to me crucial.42 It ties in
directly to what has just been discussed. And it raises a number of
issues vital to our main theme. Among these the most crucial is
that of the interaction between law and other aspects or components
of culture. There are, Maine wrote,
Two special dangers to which law and society which is held together by
law, appear to be liable in their infancy. One of them is that law may
be too rapidly developed. This occurred with the codes of the more
progressive Greek communities, which disembarrassed themselves with
astonishing facility from cumbrous forms of procedure and needless terms
of art .... The Greek intellect, with all its nobility and elasticity, was
quite unable to confine itself within the straight waistcoat of a legal
formula; .. . the Greek tribunals exhibited the strongest tendency to
confound law and fact .... No durable system of jurisprudence could be
produced in this way .... Such jurisprudence would contain no frame-
work to which the more advanced conceptions of subsequent ages could
be fitted.43
If I understand him correctly, Maine wishes here to say that a society
which fails to develop a suitably firm skeleton of law is in danger of
falling to pieces because there is nothing to hold it together. He did
not think that this danger threatened many peoples. Actually one
wonders whether the proposition can be maintained in this generality.
Certainly the Chinese civilization was built upon a similar confound-
ing of "law and fact"; but the 1i of the Confucian bureaucracy
provided as firm a framework for that society as did law for the West.
The legal solution to the problem of political and social order was
explicitly rejected in the struggle over the so-called Legists. 44 But let
us look for the other "danger," especially as Maine thought that "few
national societies have had their jurisprudence menaced by this
41. Ibid.
42. This passage was especially drawn to my attention in a discussion by
Lon Fuller.
43. MAINE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72-73. (Emphasis added.)
44. See De Bary, Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: A Seven-
teenth-Century View, in CHINESE THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS 163-203 (Fair-
bank ed. 1957), for a recent re-appraisal. The "totalitarian" interpretation
of Chinese despotism in WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM (1957), does not con-
vince me.
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peculiar danger of precocious maturity and untimely disintegration.
'45
For the other danger is much more common and it has "prevented or
arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind."46 It is the
danger that "the rigidity of primitive law, arising chiefly from its
early association and identification with religion, has chained down
the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct
which they entertained at the time when their usages were first con-
solidated into a systematic form."47 And "over the larger part of the
world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting
in adherence to the ground plan supposed to have been marked out
by the original legislator." 48 What allowed the Romans to escape from
this other danger was their theory of Natural Law. Now in point
of fact, modern scholarship has greatly reduced the importance of
natural law in the development of Roman jurisprudence 49 and has
correspondingly emphasized the traditional, especially the religious
elements-in other words precisely those elements which Maine saw
as the second "danger." But leaving aside the Romans and Maine's
questionable interpretation of their theory of natural law as a parallel
to Bentham's doctrine,50 I wish to stress here that Maine insisted that
law can seriously affect cultural development, either by giving it too
much or too little of a skeleton, framework, stability, rigidity and so
forth. This is, it seems to me, a major insight, and it is grounded in
the paradox, the dialectic of the relation of jurisprudence and his-
torical understanding. To put it hortatively: the dogmatic and
conceptual foundation of the law needs the softening impact of an
inquiry into the past in order to free itself for the future. But such
historical "softening" must not be carried too far, or the legal fabric
is dissolved and with it the society which it sustains. This two-fold
danger is by no means restricted to the infancy of human society; it
persists to the very present.
45. MAINE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73.
46. Id. at 74.
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 74-75.
49. ScHuLz, HISTORY OF ROmAN LEGAL ScINcE (1946); BRUCK, UEBER
ROamnscHEs RECHT nvt RAHmEN DER KuLTuRGESCICHTE (1954). In the latter,
the natural law is not treated at all, and Cicero's position is correspondingly
reduced to the point where Professor Bruck even says: "Jurist war er
schwerlich."
50. Maine is, of course, aware of the fact that philosophically the two doc-
trines are far apart; natural law is not "an anticipation of Bentham's
principles." Still he considers it '"ot an altogether fanciful comparison
if we call the assumptions [of natural law] the ancient counterpart of
Benthamism." The reason is that they both gave the nation and the profession"a distinct object to aim at in the pursuit of improvement." Bentham gave
England a "clear rule of reform." In short "law of nature" and "the general
good of the community" fulfilled the same function in the reshaping of the
law. For a sketch of the natural law doctrine see my TnE PHLosoPHY OF LAW
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTVE ch. IV (1958).
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In order to illuminate this aspect of the relation of law and history
further, the mooted question of codification deserves treatment here.
For the issue of codification has helped to precipitate the argument
about jurisprudence and history, the argument over whether history
and more especially the history of law matters to jurisprudence at all.
Savigny's famous essay on behalf of the historical school of juris-
prudence 5' was written in response to the proposal made at the time,
and in a spirit of patriotism, that the Germans codify their law. Sav-
igny cited Bacon for the opinion that the age in which a code is
brought into being must excel the preceding ages in legal understand-
ing, and he drew the inference that therefore some ages which might
be highly cultured in other respects do not possess the requisite
"calling" for making a code.5 2 He insisted that Germany was in that
position. He built his argument upon a general proposition in line
with our analysis here that "a two-fold understanding is indispensable
to a jurist: the historical, in order that he may grasp the peculiar
[nature] of each age and of each legal form, and the systematic one,
in order that he perceive each concept and each rule [principle] in
living connection and interaction with the whole [of the law] . . .53
Savigny felt that the German jurists of the eighteenth century did
not possess this equipment, that they were shallow rationalists, and
that the new beginning which had been made had not yet progressed
far enough, though there was hope. To fix the law at such a point
he felt was not only useless, it was dangerous, because it clothed with
authority an unsatisfactory state of the law, and he reminded his
readers of the Code of Theodoric in this connection. He also urged
that the German language had not yet developed an adequate legal
vocabulary. He then proceeded to analyze the codes that had come
into being, more especially the Code Civil or Code Napoleon.54 His
51. SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT PUER GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWIS-
SENSCHAFT (1814). I used the third edition which contains two appendices
concerned with the matter. Savigny's views have been re-studied in the
past generation; there is the detailed scholarly biography of STOLL, FRIEDRICH
KARL VON SAVIGNY (1927), in three vols.; the brilliant essay of WOLF, GROSSE
RECHTSDENKER, DER DEUTSCHEN GmsTESGESCmCHTE ch. XII (1939); and the
penetrating analytical essay by ZWIGLMEYR, DIE RECHTSLEHRE SAVIGNY'S
(1929). All three agree that behind Savigny's historicism there is to be found
a dogmatic judgment in favor of the Roman law as the standard of what
constitutes high achievement. This non-relative aspect of Savigny is crucial
for an understanding of his position on the question of codification.
52. Bacon's well-known proposals were made to King James and are
entitled "A Proposition to His Majesty . . . Touching the Compiling and
Amendment of the Laws of England" and "An Offer to King James of a
Digest To Be Made of the Laws of England." They are found in 2 BACON,
WORKS 229-36 (Philadelphia ed. 1852).
53. SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note 51.
54. For this and what follows see THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON
LAW WoRL (Schwartz ed. 1956), especially my essay, The Ideological and
Philosophical Background, id. at 1-18, and A. P. Sereni's essay, The Code
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very sharp criticism is primarily directed at the ignorance of the
four men who drafted the code, since the Conseil d'Etat contained
so many (in his view) juristically incompetent persons. How rela-
tively irrelevant this sort of criticism was, has been pointed out.
55
For Savigny was inclined to gainsay the true historical functions of
the Code Civil which lay in the cementing of national unity and to
belittle the great principles underlying it, namely (1) freedom of the
person and of contract, as well as equal right to engage in professions
and to possess property; (2) suppression of all the old privileges,
equality of all Frenchmen regardless of status, sex, or social con-
dition; and (3) freedom of civil society from all ecclesiastical control.
These were of course at the heart of the French revolution, and for
this revolution Savigny had little use. For him, as for so many
other historicist thinkers, the rationalist ingredient of the revolution-
ary credo was anathema. Yet, the Code contained many notions
deeply embedded in the old customary law, or coutumes, and it is
truly surprising to note to how large an extent Savigny could overlook
this element. "The Germanic, conservative and popular content [of
the Code] Savigny did not recognize. '56 The "errors" which Savigny
charged the drafters with were mistakes about the Roman law which
he knew so well; that their great achievement lay in the skillful use
of Pothier by Pourtalis he did not acknowledge.
It has been rightly said that "the promulgation of the Civil Code
in the year 1804 is, historically, the legislative response to a desire
expressed during many centuries by the French people."57 The Code
was not the hiatus in French legal development which Savigny's
criticism implied. In the perspective of a century and a half, it is quite
plain to see that the Code was a culmination and a starting point.
If we approach the Code as historians, the codification can be seen as
part of that ebb and flow of ideas by which the law is molded as it
evolves. The seemless web of history appears then as not torn apart
by a Code, but as merely reinforced by such a "digest." Actually, the
Code had become an inescapable necessity through the very work of
the revolution which threatened to disrupt the legal continuity. This
threat was averted and the continuity preserved with the help of the
code which, in terms of Hegel's dialectic phrase, suspended, super-
and Case Law, Id. at 55-79. In a number of other essays, S. D. Elliott, A. von
Mehren, Max Rheinstein and others show how the code has been transformed
by legislative and judicial interpretation.
55. Thus the renowned Rene Cassin remarked that "on the technical level,
proponents of the historical school could criticize the codification for having
ossified the rules of civil law and prevented certain necessary development."
Codification and National Unity, in ScHWARTz, op. cit. supra note 54, at 49.
56. WOLF, op. cit. supra note 51, at 476.




seded and preserved the old law. At this point, a distinction needs to
be drawn between different kinds of codes.
The idea of a code and of codification appears in at least three
distinguishable forms. The Justinian Code represents a first type;
one might call it the digest type. It tries to bring together and
"digest" a body of existing law, clarifying it, eliminating possible
contradictions, but not intending to alter it in any significant way.
The work of the American Law Institute has been essentially of this
character. Bacon, in the above cited memoranda, spoke as if such a
digest were what he had in mind. "The work which I propound,
tendeth to the pruning and grafting the law, and not to the ploughing
up and planting it again; for such a remove I hold indeed for a peril-
ous innovation .... ,"58 But he actually aimed at the second type. This
sort of code seeks to codify the law in terms of natural law or other
general principles which would provide a pattern for systematization.
These general principles are philosophical and political in nature and
serve as a yardstick for the evaluation of existing law; that is to say,
such a code seeks the clarification and reformation of the law in
whole or in part. General philosophical reason is here assigned a
distinctive role. Such were the codes the enlightened despots favored
and enacted, the Prussian Common Code and the Austrian Civil Law
Code, as well as the more limited codes made under Louis XIV with
the help of Colbert. Such a code was in the mind of Bacon who
flattered the king about his knowledge of "justice and judicature"
which enabled him to be a "lawgiver"; he proclaimed that "as the
common law is more worthy than the statute law, so the law of nature
is more worthy than them both. '59 Such codes were in line with the
thinking of enlightened despotism. The philosophes were the authors
of the general principles; the jurists, of the detailed application.
But there was implicit in this kind of thinking a yet more radical
position enunciated by the greatest of the philosophes, Voltaire, when
he exclaimed: "Do you want good laws? Burn yours and make new
ones!" Voltaire's dramatic demand symbolizes the revolutionary at-
titude that underlay the insistent demand for a code of laws during
the revolution. The original French revolutionary codes were of this
type of "rationality." The draft code of 1793 was revolutionary in
both intent and content. It was meant to change everything at once,
it was "the fruit of liberty." The drafters told the assembly that
"the nation will receive it as the guarantee of its happiness, and it
will offer it one day to all the peoples .... " There was only one
58. 2 BACON, op. cit. supra note 52, at 231.
59. Id. at 169. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNsTUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF
LIBERTY 43 (1957), stresses Bacon's favoring absolute monarchy.
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truth, and that was the revolutionary ideology which they had
embodied in their draft code. A still more radical code was presented
the following year; it was, in the words of one eminent French legal
scholar, "much more a manual of practical morals than a code of civil
law." Neither was adopted. The codifications of the USSR (and
subsequently of the Communist states) are really the best examples
of this type of code.60 Thus the problem of codification shows dra-
matically the range of continuity and change that law in its historical
dimension can exhibit.
It is clear that the two-fold danger of which Maine had warned
is at the heart of the argument over the problem of codification;
that is, does it make the law too rigid, or does it help to give it that
tensile strength which it requires for fulfilling its societal functions?
As has been often remarked, law in a certain sense is an organon,
an organic whole extending over centuries. Being embedded in the
history of nations, it must be seen in the perspective of their over-all
significance. We may have come a long way from the Romantic
notions of a Gierke who would interpret all history in terms of the
struggle of the Romanist principle of Herrschaft with the Germanic
principle of Genossenschaft; we may have left far behind the
equally Romantic notion of a Savigny who would interpret the
Roman law in terms of the folk spirit of the Roman people; we may
have outdistanced Maine's utilitarian enthusiasm for the progress
from status to contract as the key to all legal development. But we
cannot escape from the need of identifying our own philosophy of
history, if we are to see the historical phenomena of law-in-the-
making in the perspective of truth claims, whether scientific or
humanist.
61
Any attempt to answer the question "What is history?" involves
a philosophy of history in the sense of "general thoughts upon his-
tory." We have postponed this question until now, but we can avoid
it no longer. Our time has produced a rich variety of answers and
rejoinders to answers. Lord Acton, one of the great minds working
in that field in the recent past, thought it "the office of historical
science to maintain morality as the sole impartial criterion of men
60. See BERMAN, JUSTICE IN RUSSIA (1950); KONSTANTINOVSKY, SOVIET
Law IN ACTION (Berman ed. 1953) concerned with the codification problem;
cf. also VYsHawsxY, THE LAw OF THE SOVIET STATE (1948) for an ex cathedra
exposition.
61. Besides Collingwood and the writers cited in the next few footnotes, the
following deserve mention as significant contributions to the recent discus-
sion: ARON, INTRODUCTION A LA PixILosOPmE DE LHISTOIRE (1948); BERLIN,
HISTORICAL INEVrrAj3ny (1954); BURKE, ORIGIN OF HISTORY AS METAPHYSIC
(1950); LrT, WEGE UND IRRWEGE GESCHICHmLICHEN DENKENS (1947); MAaRoU,




and things." Others, from St. Augustine to Hegel, have seen history
as the theodicy in which God and the march of spirit were revealed
in the world of man.62 "Historicism," if not of the Augustinian, then
certainly of the Hegelian and Marxian variety, has been flailed
again and again from different viewpoints. In a perspective somewhat
akin to that of Lord Acton, one contemporary philosopher has juxta-
posed a doctrine of natural right with all such historicism which he
has called "self-contradictory or absurd."' 3 Another, noting the
"poverty of historicism," argues on the contrary that historicism, "an
antique and tottering philosophy," proclaims:
Social science is nothing but history, not however history in the tradi-
tional sense of a mere chronicle of historical facts . . . but . . . of the laws
of social development .... [Ilt could be described as historical theory
or as theoretical history, since the only universally valid social laws have
been identified as historical laws. 64
In writing thus, he emphasizes the exact opposite of the preceding
critic, namely the doctrinaire, dogmatic aspect of historicism as con-
trasted with its relativist notions. Crucially conclusive against such
a view is, in this critic's opinion, the fact that "we cannot predict,
by rational or scientific methods, the future growth of our scientific
knowledge," and "if there is such a thing as growing human know-
ledge, then we cannot anticipate to-day what we shall know only
to-morrow." 65 The trouble with historicism (and with certain kinds
of sociology derived from it) is that it believes it can predict con-
fidently. But neither can you so predict on the basis of some kind
of unchanging "human nature," as the other critic with his faith in
natural right believed.
The contradiction in the two ways of seeing "historicism" is
embedded in the phenomenon itself, as well as in the outlook of the
critics. Of these the first hopes to return to an "unchanging world"
62. For these, see LOEWITH, MEANING IN HISTORY (1949), who examines a
baker's dozen writers from Burckhardt to Orosius.
63. STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 25 (1953). See id., ch. I. Strauss
states the position of "radical historicism" as follows: "All understanding, all
knowledge, however limited and 'scientific,' presupposes a frame of reference;
it presupposes a horizon, a comprehensive view within which understanding
and knowing take place. Only such a comprehensive vision makes possible
any seeing, any observation, any orientation. The comprehensive view of the
whole cannot be validated by reasoning, since it is the basis of all reasoning.
Accordingly, there is a variety of such comprehensive views, each as legitimate
as any other: we have to choose such a view without any rational guidance."
Id. at 26-27.
64. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HIsTORicis 45 (1957). Popper, the philosopher
of science, is impressed with the passive, contemplative aspect of historicism,
its "quietism"; he notes that "the historicist can only interpret social develop-
ment and aid it in various ways; . . . nobody can change it" Id. at 52.
65. POPPER, op. cit. supra note 64, at x. The last quoted passage is given
by Popper in italics.
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such as was believed in before the historicists took over; the second
wants to transcend the "fear of change" which has driven the his-
toricist into believing in an "unchanging law" which governs the
changing world.66 To both it might be objected that the particular
view of history which they reject is the only view worthy of respect
as "philosophy of history."6 7 For only when history is seen as a whole,
is seen as world history with a meaning, can we in this perspective
speak of a "philosophy of history." Now it has been asserted that
if seen thus, philosophy of history is "entirely dependent upon the-
ology," that is to say upon the "theological interpretation of history
as salvation."8 Whether this be true or not, it is certainly a fact that
such philosophies of history have been a peculiar and distinctive fea-
ture of the West, with definite roots in the Bible, more especially
the Old Testament. The theological roots may have something to do
with the political function which such philosophies have had.
The great syntheses of these philosophies of history are closely
related to the unique importance of historical thought for the West.
For through them the self achieves the relatedness which he seeks as
a cultural being. It provides the frame within which it becomes
possible to say what needs to be said about the meaning and destiny
of this particular human being, as well of man.69 At the same time,
such a projection of the self of man and his culture expresses and
gives verisimilitude to a sense of superiority-cultural, spiritual, re-
ligious. Philosophies of history are, in this perspective, expressions of
an intellectual or spiritual imperialism such as has characterized
the West until recently and is now being transformed and reincar-
nated in the Soviet Union. This quality is inherent in such syntheses,
because they presuppose a universal goal or end of history which
can only be asserted on the basis of faith. Thus philosophies of
history are expressions of a will to power, a will to conquest even.
They correspond to other forms of ideological aggression, and the
will (or at any rate the desire) to subjugate mankind in terms of its
own good. Such destiny is apt to be described as manifest and well
calculated to heal the ills of the world, in one form or another. It is
evident that all such philosophies are variants upon the theme of the
66. POPPER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 161.
67. This appears to be the tendence of Loewith who in his discriminating
study, cited above, would not credit "every opinion about history" as a
philosophy of history, but only "the systematic interpretation of world
history on the basis of a principle." LOEWIT, op. cit. supra note 62, at 11.
68. LoEwITH, op. cit. supra note 62, at 11. Loewith speaks of Heilsgeschehen,
that is to say literally "the happening of salvation," and the title of the
German edition of his book has therefore been changed into WELTGESCHICHTE
ALS -EILSGESCHEHEN (1953).
69. NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN VOL. II, at 299-321 (1949).
Human Destiny, esp. pp. 299 ff.
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"chosen people."70 Legal history, though rarely involved in the broad
universalism of such philosophies, has tended to partake of the
valuational aggressiveness. The well-known conceit of the common
law lawyers is readily matched by the "Germanism" of a Gierke or
the "Romanism" of a Savigny. That is to say, legal history is fre-
quently infused by a pre-conceived notion of what constitutes valid
law.
As against such extravagancies, a more sober view of history, a
more skeptical philosophy, might provide a possible antidote. The
great Burckhardt, in his Reflections on World History, clearly indi-
cated his lack of interest in broad constructions. History, he thought,
was not a science of objective, "neutral" facts, but a "report about
such facts as one age finds remarkable in another." Only by thus
selecting and interpreting the reports about past events can we
determine which facts are noteworthy, important, of real significance.
He noted that "Thucydides may mention a fact the importance of
which will only be recognized in a hundred years." Such a view of
history is eminently suited to the pursuit of legal history in the best
sense. For is it not typical of the work of jurists that they re-assess
the law of past decisions-judicial, legislative, administrative-in
the light of present concerns and pre-occupations? But is it enough?
Do we not need some kind of notion of an inner development, of an
unfolding of the potentialities of the body that is law? In the work
of the greatest historians of the law, some such idea seems to have
been alive and a major motivating force of their work. Before
considering this notion of "intrinsic" development in the Aristotelian
sense of a telos that is embedded in the seed, let us consider yet
another approach.
One of the best-known students of these problems believed that the
idea of history could be circumscribed in four basic propositions, to
wit, that "history should be (a) a science, or an answering of ques-
tions; (b) concerned with human actions in the past; (c) pursued by
interpretation of evidence; and (d) for the sake of human self-
knowledge."'71 In light of such a characterization, which the author
believed to be generally held among historians, he asked the question:
Of what can there be historical knowledge? And he answered: of
that which can be re-enacted in the historian's mind. Such an answer
is obviously favorable to the historical exploration of past events
that belong to the realm of the mind, and law is certainly one of
70. For further detail see my article Die Philosophie der Geschichte als
Form der Ueberlagerung, in WmascHAPr uND KuLrusYsraM 199 (Eisermann
ed. 1955), and the literature there cited.
71. COLLnOGWOOD, TIm IDEA OF HISTORY, Introduction (1946). See note 2
supra and accompanying text.
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these. It reinforces the notion, considered by us earlier, that one
should have a knowledge of the law to be a legal historian; it would
certainly facilitate the "re-enacting." But is there not a fatal difficulty
present also, the difficulty of re-enacting anything? Heraclitus' famous
proposition that you cannot step into the same river twice, that all is
in flux, applies to the subtle matters of the spirit more poignantly
than to the "simple" passions felt by all men-love, hatred, ambition
and the rest of which so much ordinary human history is compounded.
But can we ever again recapture the way men reasoned about justice
in the days of Bracton or even of Coke? It seems most improbable.
And when we read the detailed essays of renowned scholars in the
field of legal history, it is usually clear enough what has been their
concern. Think of the debunking of Magna Carta72 and the cor-
responding work on the Declaration of Independence. 3 These two
venerable documents of legal history can now be said to represent
striking instances of myth-making and myth-destroying. As scholars
have succeeded in "re-enacting," they have also succeeded in de-
priving of genuine legal value these and other records of the past.
Is it too much to say that the more fully a particular historical event
is understood, the more remote it becomes from present concerns?
J. B. Ames recounts a rather touching anecdote of the young Langdell
in his memorial article on that great scholar. It takes us back to
the days when Langdell was studying and assisting at the Harvard
Law School. When a fellow student, the later Judge Charles E. Phelps,
surprised him among his books in the alcoves of Dane Hall, studying
a black letter folio, Langdell exclaimed, "in a tone of mingled ex-
hilaration and regret, and with an emphatic gesture: 'Oh, if only I
could have lived in the time of the Plantagenets!'" To have lived
at the time of the Plantagenets-this is indeed the problem, and the
more nearly you succeed, the less you have to offer to the twentieth
century.7 4
It is then clear (or at any rate suggested) that the continuity of
legal thought processes is to a very considerable extent a fiction.
No matter how history is conceived philosophically, the cases that
are cited over and over produce in line with stare decisis a facade of
historical support which any close inspection would reveal as largely
untenable. At the same time it must be admitted that this fiction
is of the greatest legal, that is, dogmatic importance.
72. See MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA (2d ed. 1913).
73. See BEcxER, THE DEcLAATioN OF INDIEPENDENcE (1922).
74. Cf. AMEs, LECTUR S ON LEGAL HISTORY 471 (1913). It might be re-
marked in passing that Ames states the subject of his, lectures to be "the
origin and development of the ideas of crime, tort, contract, property and
equity." The next sentence claims that "the common law is essentially of
Teutonic origin." It is not fashionable to put it that way today.
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In this country [England] and in the whole common-law world, the
place of the systematic fiction is taken to a considerable extent by the
fiction of historical continuity. Every decision appears in the cloak of a
mere application or adaptation of pre-existing "principles" laid down in
earlier judicial pronouncements. Where historical continuity and syste-
matic consistency are in conflict, it is the former which prevails ....75
In the light of what can properly be called scientific history in the
sense previously defined, this continuity is a fact only through its
being a fiction; for if the historical appreciation were truly scientific,
that is, if it were actually based upon the search and discovery of
historical truth, it would forthwith cease to be operative as a fiction.
For the cases in the past would cease to have any application to the
problems of today.
This is my conclusion, then, but it is less sceptical than it sounds.
History in the sense of past happenings is not the "meaningless" to
which meaning is arbitrarily assigned. When these happenings are
products of the mind, such as legal decisions, statutes and opinions of
jurists, they presumably had a meaning to those who brought them
into being. In searching for this meaning, this historian will be
sitting in judgment upon the rational content, both in terms of means
and ends. Thus "the judicial role appears to fit the historian's ac-
tivity better than that of the scientist checking hypotheses, the poli-
tician promoting his party's cause, or the artist fashioning a work of
art."76 This "judgment" which the historian is called upon to render
provides the intellectual bridge between him and the jurist. It is
not an arbitrary judgment such as is often assumed to have been
implied in Hegel's famous quote from Schiller's Die Resignation, but
rather the resigned judgment of the truth seeker who knows that he
will never know all of it. Why should a past decision provide author-
ity for a present one? Because there is a fair chance that the solution
it offered related sound reasoning in terms of justice to that feature
of a problematic situation which is persisting in the one now con-
fronting the jurist. It may be fiction, and the farther removed in
time, the more likely this is. But "life is but a dream," and even
fictions have their place in the economy of the mind, especially the
legal mind. The potential antagonism between the historian who may
destroy a cherished illusion and the jurist who is called upon to
provide reasoned solutions to the problems of injustice that are
facing us here and now may be resolved time and again by the
re-enforcement of a sharpened critical insight into the true "prece-
dents" which a history of the law can provide.
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76. SwABEY, THE JUDGMFNT OF HISTORY 238 (1954).
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